This critical review of the new political science literature on the causes of nuclear weapons proliferation consists of four parts. The first section briefly presents what we know about which states developed nuclear weapons and which states started but abandoned weapons development programs. I highlight the problems that result from uncertainty about the accuracy and completeness of the data. The second and third sections review the literature on the spread of the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons. We still lack robust knowledge about the relationship between the development of civilian nuclear power programs and nuclear weapons acquisition. The next two sections review the literature on the demand for nuclear weapons. Comparative case studies and statistical studies have improved our understanding of the diversity of motives for weapons development and restraints, but serious gaps in our knowledge remain. The sixth section outlines alternative theories about the potential impact of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on nuclear weapons programs decisions. Finally, I lay out a future research agenda to address the weaknesses in our current understanding of the causes of nuclear proliferation.
INTRODUCTION
Concerns about the potential spread of nuclear weapons have increased during the past decade, as North Korea tested two nuclear weapons, Iran was placed under United Nations Security Council sanctions for refusing to stop its uranium enrichment program, and more nations sought civilian nuclear power plants to produce electricity and combat global warming. The connections between the spread of civilian nuclear power and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, however, are not clear-cut. The physical connection is simple: The fuel and by-product of light-water nuclear power reactors-enriched uranium and plutoniumcan also be used to produce nuclear weapons. From a technical perspective, as Nobel Laureate Hanes Alfvén noted, "Atoms for peace and atoms for war are Siamese twins" (as quoted in Miller 1979, p. 19) . The political connections between the growth nuclear power capabilities and nuclear proliferation risks, however, are more complex. Governments that develop specific technologies related to civilian nuclear power facilities may be more capable of developing nuclear weapons, but are they therefore more likely to do so?
Although it is premature to claim, as some scholars and nuclear industry officials have done, that a "nuclear renaissance" has started with respect to the spread of nuclear power plants to new countries around the globe (Miller & Sagan 2009 , Lester & Rosner 2009 , Lavergeon 2009 , Socolow & Glaser 2009 , there has been a renaissance of scholarly interest among political scientists in explaining the causes of nuclear weapons proliferation. The new political science literature on nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation should help us understand the crucial questions about states' capabilities and motives for building the bomb, but it has thus far been of limited utility. In the literature, the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons is called the "supply-side" aspect of proliferation, and a government's motivation to develop nuclear weapons is called the "demand-side" aspect of proliferation. In this review, I argue that the supply-side literature has mistakenly focused on inaccurate measures of nuclear weapons capabilities, while the demand-side literature has paid inadequate attention to how the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and related institutions of the broader nonproliferation regime influence incentives for and against nuclear weapons acquisition. In addition, this traditional division of the subfield into supply and demand problems has in itself focused scholarly attention away from understanding the relationship between supply and demand, between a state's increased nuclear "latency" and its incentives for and against developing nuclear weapons.
There have been many positive developments in the past decade, as new theories have been developed and scholars have increasingly used multiple methods to test their theories. Despite this progress, however, the new quantitative and qualitative research projects on the causes of proliferation have been limited by the information available about the very small number of cases of nuclear weapons proliferation. Indeed, there is a deep and abiding uncertainty about the basic data on which states have sought nuclear weapons and when they started and ended their programs. We must therefore improveon the historical proliferation data sets, and yet, given the secrecy surrounding nuclear programs, some uncertainties are likely to remain. To move forward beyond that, we will also need more multidisciplinary research, with political scientists developing better understandings of the technology of nuclear power and nuclear weapons and also the effectiveness of international law and export control regimes.
This critical review of the political science literature on the causes of nuclear weapons proliferation consists of four parts. The first section below briefly presents what we know about which states developed nuclear weapons, and which states started weapons development programs but then abandoned them. I highlight the problems that result from remaining uncertainty about the accuracy and completeness of the existing data. The second and third sections review the supply-side literature. Here I argue that political scientists have largely been going down a dead-end street that has led to little robust knowledge about the relationship between the development of nuclear power programs and nuclear weapons acquisition. The fourth and fifth sections review the literature on the demand for nuclear weapons. Here I conclude that a mixture of comparative case studies and statistical studies has improved our understanding of the diversity of motives for weapons development and restraints, but that serious gaps in our knowledge remain. The sixth section outlines alternative perspectives on the role of the NPT in nuclear decision making and presents evidence on differences between democratic and nondemocratic states' compliance with the treaty. The final section lays out a future research agenda to address the weaknesses in our current understanding of the causes of nuclear proliferation. It shows a steady but slow increase. One new nuclear weapons state has emerged about every five years, and-with the exceptions of South Africa and the three former Soviet Union states that inherited the weapons (but never had operational control over them)-each state has kept its nuclear weapons once it has them. There is virtually no disagreement about what states have acquired the bomb, although there are still uncertainties about the precise year in which "second-generation" nuclear weapons states-Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea-first acquired an operational nuclear weapon.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS
We are not only interested in which states eventually acquired nuclear weapons, however, but also need to study what governments have taken preliminary steps to develop nuclear weapons and then stopped such efforts, and what governments had serious and sustained nuclear programs but nevertheless failed to develop the bomb. Scholars have thus usefully divided nuclear proliferation into phases (explore, pursue, and acquire), even though in practice it can be difficult to determine when a state actually falls into these categories. Figure 2 (see color insert) displays my estimates of when states started exploring nuclear weapons programs, and when they abandoned their nuclear weapons development efforts (with the exceptions of Iran and Syria, which are coded as continuing a covert nuclear weapons program). There is no single explanation for why states give up their bomb programs (Campbell et al. 2004 , Levite 2003 , Paul 2000 , Reiss 1995 , Rublee 2009 ). Some of these "nuclear reversal" cases were U.S. allies who received strong diplomatic pressure from Washington to stop suspected covert programs (Taiwan, South Korea); another resulted from "disarmament by force" (Iraq). Some governments dismantled their bomb programs after or in anticipation of domestic regime change (Romania, Brazil, South Africa); others ended their pursuit of nuclear weapons when an ally terminated joint nuclear weapons development agreements (Italy, Germany). But many acts of both nuclear reversal and abstinence appear to be more voluntary in nature and, as discussed below, the emergence of the NPT in 1968 and the later addition of related institutions, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), appear to have influenced many decisions to refrain from developing military applications of nuclear power programs.
It is important to note, however, that significant uncertainty exists about whether and when to code particular states as exploring or pursuing the bomb. This uncertainty exists in part because many governments pursuing nuclear weapons place veils of secrecy around their programs; in other cases, however, uncertainty about a government's nuclear weapons program exists because the government itself never determined whether early nuclear-related research was to be used only for future power program development or for future nuclear weapons development.
The small-numbers problem and the lingering uncertainty about the accuracy of the data combine to create enormous difficulties for both the quantitative and case-study literatures on nuclear proliferation. In the quantitative literature, the relatively small number of "confirmed" states that have tried to develop the bomb has meant that the discovery of additional states, or the removal of states from the data set because of new "disconfirming" evidence, can significantly reduce the robustness of many authors' findings about the causes of proliferation (Montgomery & Sagan 2009 . For example, Montgomery & Sagan 2011) show that adding new confirmed cases of states that sought nuclear weapons to the data set developed by Jo & Gartzke (2007a) significantly reduces the magnitude of, and in some cases even reverses, their statistical findings about correlations between a state's membership in the NPT, the nuclear threats of its adversary, the diffusion of nuclear technology, and the status of that state's nuclear weapons program.
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For the qualitative literature, the deep secrecy surrounding many governments' nuclear weapons decisions means that reasonable scholars can still defend conflicting interpretations of when and why particular governments chose to move forward or contain their nuclear weapons programs. For example, scholars disagree about whether Argentina's nuclear program was designed to fuel naval reactors for a submarine fleet or for a nuclear weapon (Hymans 2001 , Müller & Schmidt 2010 , while other observers continue to debate whether the Japanese government has ever actively pursued a nuclear weapons option (Campbell & Sunohara 2004 , Japan Times 2010 . In short, the small number of cases and remaining uncertainties about key historical decisions present a significant and continuing challenge to understanding when and why proliferation occurs.
THE SUPPLY-SIDE LITERATURE
Ever since John F. Kennedy predicted in 1963 that there might be as many as "fifteen, twenty, or twenty-five nuclear weapons powers" in the 1970s, statesmen and scholars alike have been surprised that the pace of nuclear proliferation has been so much slower than predicted . Indeed, Hymans (2010, p. 13) argues that "the basic puzzle facing the study of nuclear proliferation is why there is such a large and persistent gap between the technically nuclear weaponscapable states-at present there are perhaps as many as fifty-and the small number of actual nuclear weapons states." Much of the new supply-side literature has been obsessed with this puzzle. The underlying assumption here, that more and more states have become "nuclear weapons capable," however, depends crucially on how one defines and measures nuclear weapons capability.
What does it mean for a state to be capable of building nuclear weapons? The central weakness of the coding rules by which political scientists have labeled states "nuclear capable" is clear once one delves into the methodology used in their studies (Sagan 2010) . The current generation of proliferation specialists have built on the methodology and coding rules used in Meyer's (1984) pioneering book The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation and Stoll's (1996) update of the Meyer data through 1992. Meyer (1984) carefully measured a set of ten technical and economic indicators-national mining activity, indigenous uranium deposits, metallurgists, steel production, construction work force, chemical engineers, nitric acid production, electrical production capacity, nuclear engineers, physicists, chemists, and explosives and electronics specialists-to produce what he called "a list of nations with latent capabilities to manufacture nuclear weapons" (p. 41). Because he could not measure directly whether the quantity or quality of a state's nuclear engineers and its explosives and electronics specialists were sufficient to build a nuclear weapon, Meyer used two proxy indicators: whether the state had been operating a research reactor for three years (the proxy for nuclear engineering expertise) and whether the state manufactured automobiles, or assembled automobiles and manufactured radios and television sets (the proxy for expertise in explosives and electronics). Based on this particular set of indicators, Meyer found that 34 states held the latent capability to build nuclear weapons in 1982. Stoll (1996) updated the Meyer data set, with a hidden yet significant change in coding rules, in the mid-1990s: Whereas Meyer had measured indigenous uranium sources, Stoll simply assumed that all states had access to nuclear materials, claiming that they were now freely available in the global marketplace. Stoll thus assumed away the crucial technical bottleneck of whether a state has access to uranium that, once enriched, could be used in a nuclear weapons program. Based on the resulting data set, Stoll argued that 48 states had a latent nuclear weapons capability in 1992 (Figure 3 ; see color insert). Hymans (2004, p. 4; accepted the logic of that argument, updated Stoll's proliferation estimates, and claimed that the data demonstrate a "yawning gap between technical potential and military reality," expressed by the contrast between the number of states that have the capability to produce nuclear weapons and the number that have actually done so. A state cannot make a nuclear weapon, however, unless it has highly enriched uranium or plutonium from a large reactor, and Stoll's hidden assumption that any state could acquire uranium on the open market, coupled with his use of research reactor experience as the measure of required nuclear engineering expertise, essentially removed those two technical constraints. Jo & Gartzke (2007b) alter the Stoll coding scheme by dropping three of the Stoll and Meyer indicators (construction workforce, steel production, and previous national mining activity) on the grounds that they are "too easily available to be thresholds" and modifying the coding for necessary "uranium deposits" (which, as we have seen, were assumed by Stoll to be available for all states) to include either a IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency state with uranium deposits on its territory or a state that has acquired "produced uranium" for a research or power reactor. (See Table 1 for a comparison of the various coding schemes.)
Yet, although Jo & Gartzke (2007a, p . 169 correctly note that "states that lack the basic material capabilities will be excluded from the group of potential proliferators," their coding rules do not in fact treat the possession of fissile materials (enriched uranium or plutonium) as a necessary but not sufficient condition for building nuclear weapons. Instead, Jo & Gartzke implicitly assume that "where there is a will, there is a way" because their coding rules lead to states being labeled as "nuclear weapons capable" without having the necessary fissile materials to make even one bomb. The evidence that Jo & Gartzke's coding rules do not adequately capture the necessary conditions for nuclear weapons development is apparent in the fact that their data set coded North Korea as not having full capability to develop nuclear weapons in 2001 (it still lacked sufficient chemical engineers, nitric acid production capability, and explosives specialists), even though North Korea was a major exporter of long-range missiles at the time and the North Koreans were known to have separated plutonium from the fuel rods of the Yongbyon reactor (May 2001) . The Jo & Gartzke coding rules also led to the odd conclusion that South Africa lacked the capability to build nuclear weapons in 2001-even though it had built six nuclear weapons in the 1980s and, after dismantling the weapons in the 1990s, still maintained 450-600 kg of highly enriched uranium according to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard inspections (Purkitt et al. 2002) . (Within Jo & Gartzke's coding rules, South Africa did not have the "necessary" chemical engineers and nitric acid production capacity.)
By not focusing attention on enriched uranium and plutonium, the weak proxy measures for nuclear weapons capability used by Jo & Gartzke clearly lead to bizarre results. Trinidad and Tobago (which "only" lacks uranium deposits, "produced uranium," and any research reactor experience) is assessed to have had a higher degree of nuclear weapons latency in 2001 than is North Korea, which was only five years away from detonating its first nuclear weapon. Egypt, which had only two research reactors in 2001, is assessed to have a higher degree of nuclear weapons latency than is South Africa ( Jo & Gartzke 2007b ). These problems are examples of a common weakness in the quantitative political science literature on proliferation (Montgomery & Sagan 2009 . All too often the authors look for the keys under the lamppost: They use "proxy variables" that are easily available, rather than collecting the data that reflect the substantive variables of real interest. For example, scholars interested in measuring nuclear "weaponization capability" could have built original data sets on related arms-manufacturing experience and expertise, but instead they used preexisting data on automobile and television manufacturing. Furthermore, there are often hidden, but crucial, assumptions in this literature, such as "the open market enables all states to get nuclear materials," that have a strong but unacknowledged impact on the findings. Finally, the new quantitative proliferation literature in political science frequently conflates two analytically different phenomena under the same labels of "nuclear weapons capability" or "nuclear latency": first, what should properly be called "nuclear self-sufficiency"-a measure of how independent or self-sufficient a potential long-term nuclear weapons program could be; and second, "nuclear latency"-a measure of how quickly a state could develop a nuclear weapon from its current state of technological development if it chose to do so (Sagan 2010) .
In short, by focusing our attention away from the acquisition of the necessary fissile materials, the supply-side proliferation literature has led to a grossly exaggerated estimate of how many states currently have the technical capability to build nuclear weapons. Indeed, the appropriate proliferation puzzle may not be why so many "nuclear weapons capable" states have refrained from building nuclear weapons, but why so few states have acquired the facilities and technology needed to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium. In 2010, ten states are known to have uranium enrichment facilities (World Nuclear Association 2010), and eight states, only one of which is a non-nuclear weapons 
NEW SUPPLY-SIDE RESEARCH: BRINGING BACK THE FUEL
Two new contributions have helped improve the literature by focusing precisely on the technologies needed to link nuclear power to nuclear proliferation: nuclear exports and technology agreements regarding nuclear fuel production, reprocessing technology, nuclear engineering training, and power and research reactors. First, Kroenig (2009a Kroenig ( ,b, 2010 argues that international sensitive nuclear assistance contributes to the spread of nuclear weapons. Kroenig defines sensitive nuclear assistance as giving information on weapons design or construction, providing large amounts of weaponsgrade fissile material, or assisting in the construction of facilities for uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing that could be used to produce weapons-grade fissile material. He tests his theory both statistically and through three case studies of countries that acquired nuclear weapons after having received sensitive nuclear assistance: Israel, China, and Pakistan. Kroenig (2009a Kroenig ( , 2010 finds that sensitive nuclear assistance is positively correlated to acquisition of a nuclear bomb, as is gross domestic product, the state's overall industrial capacity, rivalry with nuclear weapons states, and regime type. He carefully traces the importance of sensitive nuclear assistance in the history of his three case studies and also examines other cases of states acquiring such assistance and exploring weapons programs. His central conclusion-"states that have the ability to produce nuclear weapons, either through international assistance or domestic capacity, are much more NNWS: non-nuclear weapons state likely to do so" (2009a, p. 176)-is certainly true but hardly counterintuitive. Indeed, 5 of Kroenig's 14 cases include not just assistance in building enrichment or reprocessing facilities but help in the design of nuclear weapons themselves. The fact that the states that were given bomb designs were more likely than other states to later acquire nuclear weapons is hardly surprising.
Kroenig's important contribution to our understanding of proliferation, however, is on the causes of sensitive nuclear assistance (2009b, 2010) . Why do states sell or give sensitive nuclear assistance to others, given the likelihood that this might encourage weapons proliferation? Most scholars and policy makers have assumed that governments do this for economic reasons or because they fail to predict the nuclear proliferation consequences of their nuclear technology export policy. Kroenig, however, finds that this is rarely the case. Instead, governments often provide sensitive assistance for political and strategic reasons, and this is true because of, rather than despite, the anticipated proliferation consequences. Governments are more likely to transfer sensitive technologies into regions in which they cannot project conventional military power and to states that are rivals of their enemies. "In other words, states may calculate that the enemy of their enemy is their best customer," Kroenig (2010, p. 38) tersely argues. This is an important (and disturbing) finding. The second new contribution to the supplyside proliferation literature is the work of Fuhrmann (2009a,b) . In contrast to Kroenig, Fuhrmann (2009a, p. 8) claims that the spread of all types of peaceful nuclear technology, not just "sensitive" nuclear technology, increases the likelihood of proliferation: "The conventional wisdom is wrong-and dangerous. All types of civilian nuclear assistance raise the risks of proliferation. Peaceful nuclear cooperation and proliferation are causally connected because of the dual-use nature of nuclear technology and know-how." Fuhrmann acknowledges that the vast majority of states that have received civil nuclear assistance agreements have not acquired weapons (in 99.77% of countryyear observations, states receiving civilian nuclear assistance did not acquire the bomb), but he also insists that there is a strong statistical and causal link between the number of nuclear cooperation agreements (NCAs) and the likelihood that a country will initiate a nuclear weapons program and eventually acquire the bomb. Fuhrmann asserts that "nuclear cooperation strongly influences whether a country goes down the nuclear [weapons] path. Participation in at least one nuclear cooperation agreement increases the likelihood of beginning a bomb program by about 500%" (2009a, p. 32).
Fuhrmann's central insight-that a state may acquire dual-use technology with only peaceful intent, but then succumb to the temptation to initiate weapons research when international threats emerge-is an important one. However, there are three problems with his analysis. First, his estimate about the substantive effects of NCAs on initiation of weapons programs is overstated. In his crosstabular analysis, 3 states are coded as having pursued nuclear weapons without NCAs (0.07% of observations) and 12 states pursued weapons after receiving NCAs (0.42% of observations). Although technically this does mean that states with NCAs are >500% more likely to start nuclear weapons programs than are states that did not have NCAs, the likelihood of any state, even after signing an NCA, pursuing nuclear weapons is still less than half a percent. Moreover, the lag time Fuhrmann includes in his pursuit variable drops Russia and the United States from this analysis entirely, further overemphasizing this effect.
Second, there is an endogeneity problem: Fuhrmann did not adequately control for whether the countries in question were already exploring the nuclear weapons option when they signed NCAs. It seems reasonable that a country's interest in nuclear weapons technology would make participation in an NCA more likely, and thus it could be that NCAs are not causing later weapons programs, but rather that plans for nuclear weapons programs are motivating NCAs. The Singh & Way (2004) data set, which Fuhrmann uses for coding pursuit and acquisition, also includes a measure for when states first explored nuclear weapons that he does not utilize. Of Fuhrmann's five case studies, three countries-Israel, Pakistan, and India-received substantial nuclear assistance after they were already coded by Singh & Way as exploring, but not pursuing, nuclear weapons. North Korea received aid from the Soviet Union at about the same time it began exploring. Only South Africa received all of its aid before exploring in 1969, and it is notable that this assistance was provided in the 1950s, before the establishment of the NPT regime.
Third, Fuhrmann uses aggregate NCAs as the crucial independent variable, which is problematic. This variable places a great deal of weight on countries, like India, that participated in a large number of NCAs prior to acquisition of nuclear weapons. Fuhrmann also includes a number of cases in which NCAs were offered to a state that was known to be exploring a nuclear weapons option in an attempt to provide economic carrots to keep the state from pursuing nuclear weapons to completion. And Fuhrmann includes NCAs that were negotiated and signed but then canceled before coming into fruition (Kroenig in Bluth et al. 2010) .
THE DEMAND-SIDE LITERATURE
Different studies of why states are interested in acquiring nuclear weapons examine different incentives and often focus on different actors who influence government decisions. Early work on the demand for nuclear weapons focused on the utility of using international relations theories to derive alternative testable hypotheses. Solingen's 1994 article "The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint" contrasted neorealist predictions about the importance PL14CH11-Sagan ARI 18 February 2011 17:14 of threats to her own prediction that "ruling coalitions pursuing economic liberalization are more likely to embrace regional nuclear regimes than their inward-looking, nationalist, and radical-confessional counter-parts" (p. 136). Sagan's 1996 article "Three Models in Search of a Bomb" compared the influence of security threats, domestic political interests, and international norms on nuclear proliferation decisions. The first of the three models focused on military security motivations; the second emphasized domestic political actors or bureaucratic coalitions that form to support or oppose nuclear weapons for parochial reasons; and the third focused on norms and prestige considerations that can encourage or discourage acquisition of nuclear weapons (Sagan 1996 (Sagan /1997 (Sagan , 1999 . Sagan found strongest support for the security model, but he argued that domestic interests and normative concerns about prestige were "sufficient, but not necessary" conditions for proliferation in a limited number of cases. Scholarly debate has continued for two decades about how to weigh these different motivations for proliferation. Some scholars argue for the prime importance of security motivations (Mearsheimer 1990 , Frankel 1993 , Frankel & Davis 1993 , Thayer 1995 , Paul 2000 , Hecker 2010 , others for the importance of the constraints or incentives stemming from domestic economic interests (Lavoy 1993 , Solingen 1998 , Liberman 2001 , and some constructivist scholars focus on normative constraints and changing identities of individual leaders or governments (Chafetz et al. 1996 , Katzenstein 1996 , Grillot & Long 2000 , Tannenwald 2007 , Rublee 2009 .
The new quantitative studies of proliferation have assessed states' motivations using different data sets, different coding rules for key variables, and different statistical methods, all of which could add to the robustness of their results if there were common findings. Unfortunately, that is not the case. Singh & Way's (2004) hazard model finds strong support for both enduring rivalries and militarized disputes as causes of proliferation, while Jo & Gartzke's (2007a) probit model finds strong support for status-driven motives and somewhat less support for domestic political and international security motives, with an especially interesting counterintuitive finding that rivalry with a nuclear weapons state is negatively correlated with both program and acquisition. Bleek's (2010) hazard model, using an updated data set of states that explored, pursued, and acquired the bomb, finds in contrast that there is no correlation between states' decisions to pursue nuclear weapons or eventually acquire them and one or more of that state's enduring rivals having pursued or acquired nuclear weapons. Singh & Way (2004) , Jo & Gartzke (2007a) , and Bleek (2010) all do find that security guarantees from a nuclear power have weak or no effect on a state's decision to explore a nuclear weapons option, yet this may be due to selection effects: It seems reasonable to assume that a nuclear weapons state will be more likely to offer a security guarantee to a country either facing a significant nuclear threat or exploring nuclear weapons options. Thus, security guarantees may have a stronger causal effect in the real world than is captured by the correlations in the observed data.
NEW DEMAND-SIDE RESEARCH: BRINGING BACK LEADERSHIP
Three recent case-study works by Abraham, Hymans, and Solingen have added significantly to our understanding of specific national and regional cases of proliferation and nonproliferation by developing new theoretical constructs. Each of these scholars focuses attention on the interests and strategic preferences of government leaders and tests his or her theories against a limited set of cases. It will be especially valuable, therefore, for future researchers to test these theories more broadly.
Abraham has not only written one of the best studies of the Indian nuclear power and weapons program but has also introduced the important concept of "nuclear ambivalence" to the subfield (Abraham 1998 (Abraham , 2006 (Abraham , 2009 nuclear weapons proliferation leads to a deep misunderstanding of the relationship between civilian nuclear power and nuclear weapons. Most scholars (like most U.S. intelligence analysts) have examined the kinds of nuclear facilities a country developed and have tried to discern whether the government is really building only a civilian energy capability or is secretly seeking to develop a latent or breakout nuclear weapons capability. Thus, scholars often write about "nuclear ambiguity" (is the government seeking weapons or not?) or "nuclear opacity" (is the government hiding nuclear facilities to cover its intentions?) when assessing the meaning of specific programs (Frankel 1991 , Frankel & Davis 1993 . Abraham argues, in contrast, that government leaders may not have strong and well-developed intentions in the nuclear field at all. They may suffer from basic ambivalence; they could be persuaded to push for weapons or for civilian power, depending on a wide range of political and social factors that emerge long after they have constructed the physical and organizational foundations for their nuclear program. Abraham tests his theory largely against evidence of the diversity and fluidity of motives seen inside the Indian nuclear program between 1945 and the Pokhran nuclear weapons tests in 1998. He places prime importance on the domestic power and political autonomy of what he calls the "strategic enclave" of probomb scientists and government bureaucrats inside the Indian nuclear establishment (Abraham 1998; also see Bajpai 2009). Still he argues that the phenomenon of "nuclear ambivalence" is common inside other capitals and nuclear bureaucracies, especially in the less developed world. He further warns that nonproliferation policies to dissuade ambivalent actors not to do what they have no intention to do can backfire, setting off national or bureaucratic resistance to external pressures. Hymans (2006) makes a similarly creative theoretical contribution, and his detailed case histories of rarely studied incidents of proliferation and restraint add significantly to our knowledge. Realism assumes that most leaders would want nuclear weapons for security if they had the opportunity to get them; Hymans' central argument turns this assumption on its head. Very few leaders want nuclear weapons, he conjectures, because building the bomb is "a revolutionary decision" and "a leap into the dark." The decision makers cannot know whether the state will be able to build an arsenal, nor whether the strategic effect will enhance or damage national security. Nuclear proliferation is therefore rare, not because of institutional constraints or alliance pressures, but rather "because few state leaders may in fact need to be constrained from seeking the bomb" (p. 12). Hymans develops a psychological theory, placing causal importance on what he calls the "oppositional nationalist" identity of some leaders, who see their nation as naturally in a hostile relationship with other states and see themselves as inherently superior to (or at least the equal of) their enemies. For such leaders, getting the bomb is not just a matter of a rational cost-benefit calculation of state or even party self-interest: "Driven by fear and pride, oppositional nationalists develop a desire for nuclear weapons that goes beyond calculation, to self-expression" (Hymans 2006, p. 2) .
Hymans' case studies are particularly rich. He uncovers, for example, important new historical evidence suggesting that Argentina's uranium enrichment program, contrary to the common coding in the literature, may have been designed to produce nuclear fuel for a submarine fleet instead of being part of a covert nuclear weapons program. This is a fine example of how a case study can contribute to building and revising the data sets needed for broader tests of theories of proliferation. And to his credit, Hymans does not rely on his historical case studies of nuclear decision making in India, Argentina, France, and Australia to measure his key independent variable, which would be especially problematic for such an inductively derived theory. Instead, he develops a complex measure of "national identity conception" and uses a quantitative content analysis of political leaders' major public speeches (such as a state-of-the-union address) to assess whether the leader can be accurately coded as an PL14CH11-Sagan ARI 18 February 2011 17:14 oppositional nationalist. This provides a check to reduce the danger that Hymans might use his knowledge of the final outcome to influence his coding of the leaders' national identity. Although both Abraham and Hymans have developed valuable new theories and have conducted strong, albeit limited, tests of their ideas, their work shares a weakness: Not only do they themselves not test their theories on a wider set of cases, but it is also not clear how they or other scholars could do so given the deliberately covert nature of many nuclear weapons programs. Abraham may be right about some governments or leaders holding ambivalent positions on nuclear matters, but how could outside scholars measure the degree to which this is the case when decisions are being discussed and made behind a veil of secrecy? Moreover, scholars have not yet developed compelling measures of bureaucratic power and autonomy that could help quantitative researchers determine whether the Indian "strategic enclave" phenomenon is an outlier or a more common occurrence (Sagan 2009a , Sasikumar & Way 2009 ). Similarly, Hymans may be right about the influence of oppositional nationalism in the cases he has studied, but how can an outside analyst accurately measure such psychological characteristics for specific leaders making nuclear decisions who do not make many public announcements, or whose positions are strategically misrepresented to foreign or domestic audiences for bargaining purposes? In short, Abraham and Hymans raise important theoretical questions and provide valuable empirical understanding of specific cases, but it will be a major challenge for future scholars to assess the broader strength of their theories about nonproliferation.
Finally, Solingen's Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (2007) compares the nuclear behavior of states in those two regions, which had similar qualities in the early 1970s but have since experienced different nuclear trajectories. Solingen's focused regional comparison methodology uses detailed case studies in order to test her preferred theory-a "global integration" model that focuses on the degree to which the government bases its domestic political survival on economic integration into the global economy-against alternative realist (security factors), neo-institutionalist (the NPT), and norms-and-constructivist (the nuclear taboo and global citizenship) theories. Her findings strongly support her global economic integration theory: States whose leaders or ruling coalitions advocate integration into the global economy (mostly in East Asia) reject nuclear weapons development, whereas leaders or coalitions that favor inward-looking reliance on domestic markets and nationalist values (mostly in the Middle East) are more prone to pursue nuclear weapons.
The strength of case studies is the detailed tracing of the causal influences of economic interests, but the weakness of this methodology is its inability to assess broader generalizability of the theory. Other scholars' quantitative tests of Solingen's global economic integration model have produced mixed findings. Singh & Way's (2004) hazard model tested the effects of two independent variables regarding a state's integration into the global economy-a state's "interdependence" as measured by trade ratios (exports and imports as a share of GDP) and a state's "liberalization" as measured by movement toward or away from higher trade interdependence. Singh & Way found that higher trade ratios were negatively and significantly correlated to all three measures of proliferation (exploration, program, and acquisition), but that economic liberalization was insignificant at all three stages. In fact, in the exploreand-acquire phase, liberalization had a weak positive correlation. Singh & Way's quantitative analysis thus offers only tepid support for Solingen's theory. Bleek (2010) uses a slightly different data set on states that sought and acquired the bomb, but the same proxy measure for economic interdependence and liberalization as Singh & Way, and also reports mixed findings. However, they are not the same mixed findings: Economic interdependence is negatively correlated with the exploration of nuclear weapons, is not significantly correlated to pursuit, and is positively correlated to nuclear weapons acquisition. Like Singh & Way, however, Bleek finds that economic liberalization is not significantly correlated with proliferation at any stage.
Solingen's case studies are impressive and have produced counterintuitive findings. Her detailed case study of Japanese nuclear decision making in the 1970s, for example, reverses the usual causal arrow regarding the relationship between security guarantees and nonproliferation commitments. In "a fine example of intellectual judo" (Hymans 2010 ), Solingen presents evidence that Japanese leaders, who were already opposed to Japanese nuclear weapons on economic grounds, successfully sought tighter U.S. security assurances in order to justify their antinuclear positions in domestic debates in Tokyo. In addition, Solingen's focus on what she calls changing "world time" in proliferation-the 1968 NPT is seen as a watershed that alters the incentives and disincentives for states to seek nuclear weapons-is an important warning to quantitative researchers not to expect identical patterns of proliferation and restraint over the entire nuclear age.
This focus on the post-1968 NPT world time, however, makes it more puzzling that Solingen denigrates the role of the treaty and does not examine whether the NPT was necessary for "liberalizing" governments to be concerned that movement toward a nuclear weapons program would lead to international sanctions or other restrictions on the potential benefits from integrating into the global economy. In addition, Solingen does not focus sufficient attention on the nuclear industry in NNWSs, which can be major engines of global economic integration, if they feel that their access to foreign technology and fuel will be restricted if there is any suspected weaponsrelated research in their nations. As noted below, the position of the nuclear industry may be one of the most important determinants of whether a government eventually moves toward developing nuclear weapons options or toward becoming an even stronger supporter of nuclear nonproliferation.
THE NPT, REGIME TYPE, AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Despite this lack of consensus about the central causes of nuclear proliferation, there are two specific agreements in both the case-study and the quantitative political science literature: (a) the NPT does not have significant effects on the likelihood of proliferation and (b) regime type has only a minimal effect on proliferation. Because of the (false) consensus that the capability to build nuclear weapons is already widely available, most political scientists studying proliferation are highly skeptical of the potential effect of efforts to control the supply of nuclear technology. Hymans (2006, p. 220) argues that "given the widespread diffusion of nuclear capacities, supply-side control measures against potential proliferant states are clearly of declining utility." Jo & Gartzke (2007a, pp. 185-86) maintain that "the inhibiting effect of the NPT is overcome by the stronger technological diffusion effect" and conclude that "enthusiasm for the NPT among proliferation opponents thus appears to be misplaced." Solingen (2007, p. 31) Betts' statement is anachronistic. He ignores how many states not considered "problematic" today were in fact feared potential proliferators in the past. In 1963, for example, National Intelligence Estimate 4-63 and a Robert McNamara Department of Defense report predicted that eight countries could develop nuclear weapons by 1973: China, India, Sweden, Australia, Israel, South Africa, Japan, and West Germany (Lavoy 2004) . Egypt was considered to have "moderate to high" motivation and a capability to acquire nuclear weapons later in the 1970s; and Argentina, Brazil, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia were all feared to be able to develop the bomb by the 1980s (Lavoy 2004) . To understand the role of the NPT, one should not select on the dependent variable and concentrate only on recent "problematic" cases of states that acquired or try to acquire the bomb. Instead, one should also study the broader set of cases of "nuclear abstinence" (states that refrained from starting a weapons program) and also examine the history of the many states that gave up their programs before they joined the treaty and those that cheated on their NPT commitments, were caught, and were encouraged or forced to abide by their Article II commitment not to seek nuclear weapons.
Moreover, the NPT included requirements for NNWS members to accept safeguardsinspections run by the IAEA-on their nuclear power facilities as a precondition for receiving peaceful nuclear assistance (Scheinman 1987 , Schiff 1984 . This IAEA inspection system has caught a number of states (including Iran, North Korea, South Korea, and Egypt) either cheating on their NPT commitments or at least engaging in ambiguous but suspicious weapons-related activities (Acton 2009). Thus, the NPT should not be seen as irrelevant because some states have not complied with their commitments, for it is the treaty which sets up the inspections that permit us to know when cheating occurs. This relates, however, to the second area of agreement in the literature, regarding regime type and proliferation. Democracies and autocracies are seen to be similar in their proliferation behavior; if anything, democracies are found to be slightly more likely to go nuclear than nondemocracies. Jo & Gartzke (2007a) find that regime type makes no difference in whether a government initiates a nuclear weapons program, but that democracies are more likely than nondemocracies to acquire nuclear weapons once they have a program. The authors speculate that this is due to one of two causes: "democracies are more vulnerable to nationalist pressure" ( Jo & Gartzke 2007a, p. 179) or "partial democratic states use nuclear weapons proliferation as a diversion for domestic political reasons" (p. 184). Singh & Way (2004) also find that democracies are more likely to acquire nuclear weapons. The results of their hazard model show that democracy makes states 25% more likely to explore, 95% more likely to acquire, and slightly more likely to pursue nuclear weapons. Their multinomial logit model offers similar results, with the exception that it suggests that democracies are slightly less likely to pursue nuclear weapons. Singh & Way (2004, p. 864) explain their findings on democracy by arguing that "democratic governments may be tempted to pander to nationalist populations in an effort to boost their popularity and retain power." Kroenig (2009b, p. 172) similarly notes that democracy measures are positively correlated with nuclear weapons acquisition, arguing that his model "provides support for the idea that democratic states may be more prone to nuclear proliferation because they may be subject to pressure from domestic constituencies that favor nuclear development. " Fuhrmann (2009a, p. 36) finds the coefficient for democracy to be positive, but not significantly so.
These findings oversimplify the role of regime type in determining nuclear proliferation behavior. Democratic countries have certainly both pursued and acquired nuclear weapons, but the new quantitative literature has ignored the important observation that no NNWS democracy has cheated on its commitments under the NPT. In all past cases, democracies that started and either abandoned or completed nuclear weapons programs either did so before the NPT came into force or did not join the NPT at all (Müller & Schmidt 2010 , Miller & Sagan 2009 ). Figure 4 (see color insert) reproduces the data from Figure 2 on when different states started nuclear exploration and nuclear programs, adding their NPT ratification dates and a measure of their regime type based on the Polity IV data set (http://www.systemicpeace.org/ polity/polity4.htm). This figure clearly shows that democracies have behaved differently with respect to nuclear weapons proliferation. Democracies have both sucessfully developed nuclear weapons and started but then abandoned nuclear programs. But no democratic NNWS has ever started a covert nuclear weapons program after the government ratified the NPT.
NEW PROLIFERATION PUZZLES AND RESEARCH AGENDAS
Social science research should help us better predict the likely nuclear future as well as explain the nuclear past. But to do so, scholars will need to use multi-methods research designs to take advantage of the strengths of both quantitative and case-study methods, and also develop more accurate understandings of the technical and institutional conditions under which nuclear proliferation and restraint decisions are made. In particular, scholars will need to focus more attention on four related puzzles.
How the Non-Proliferation Treaty Works
We have a strong literature on institutions dealing with whether international political economy and human rights treaties constrain their members, but much less on international security treaties, especially nuclear weapons proliferation (Chayes & Chayes 1995; Moravcsik 2000; Simmons 2000 Simmons , 2010 Dai 2007) . Indeed, it is revealing that Simmons' (2010) Annual Review of Political Science article, "Treaty Compliance and Violation," discusses trade treaties, human rights treaties, and alliances, but says nothing about the NPT. How exactly does the NPT work? Neoliberal institutional theory sees the NPT as a solution to two collective action problems. The NWSs find it useful not to provide nuclear weapons to their allies, provided the other NWSs likewise refrain, and Article I of the treaty enshrines this joint commitment. The NNWSs find it in their interest to constrain themselves from developing nuclear weapons only if they can be reassured that their NNWS neighbors are practicing similar constraints, and Article II and the IAEA safeguards inspectors provide precisely that reassurance (Sagan 1996 , Dai 2007 ). An alternative "domestic politics model" sees the NPT as promoting "responsible" use of civilian nuclear power, and the actors who are empowered by the treaty and manage nuclear power plants in their state have parochial reasons to adhere to their treaty commitments (Sagan 1996 (Sagan /1997 . The IAEA creates an inspection mechanism that makes it easier for governments to monitor their own scientists' behavior, and the growth of nuclear power in the state increases the potential economic costs that powerful actors would face if sanctions were enacted because their government was accused of having a covert weapons program. In addition, the NPT can tip the domestic balance of power in NNWSs as new bureaucratic actors favoring compliance with treaty obligations are created and strengthened through the NPT review conferences and related meetings. Ratifying the treaty can have special strength in democracies if fear of paying domestic audience costs encourages leaders to maintain treaty commitments.
A third, more "realist" approach sees the NPT largely as a way to manage hypocrisy: The NWSs claim to be committed to nuclear disarmament under Article VI in order to encourage the NWWSs to accept a "secondclass" nuclear status. In particular, the NPT under this theory was designed in the 1960s primarily to constrain Germany and India; opening the treaty for universal signature was PL14CH11-Sagan ARI 18 February 2011 17:14 merely a face-saving device to make the constraints more politically acceptable in Bonn and New Delhi (Swango 2009 It will be important, however, not to seek a master theory for how the treaty works, for I see no reason to assume that the NPT has identical pathways of influence for different states. Indeed, like many treaties, the NPT is a complex institution representing a set of compromises between the governments that negotiated its content. We know very little about why different governments joined the NPT and how their interests and interpretations have shaped the patterns of their compliance behavior (see, however, Erickson & Way 2011 and . There are likely to be some states who joined the NPT to cement a nonproliferation bargain with regional rivals; some cheater states that joined while already having or planning covert nuclear weapons programs; and many more states that joined hoping membership would increase civilian nuclear technology transfer to them. There are likely to be even more states that joined the NPT as a part of joining the world order and have no intention of ever developing a civilian nuclear energy infrastructure, much less nuclear weapons, such as Bhutan, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji. Indeed, even the Holy See, hardly a candidate for nuclear power nor a nuclear weapons concern, is a member of the NPT.
Given this complex and diverse set of motives for joining the treaty, we should not expect to find that a state's NPT status is related to its nuclear proliferation behavior in any simple manner. In addition, we should not assume that states' interests in the NPT are set in stone. Legal research on the NPT and other international treaties has suggested that developing world actors have become less willing in the postcolonial period to accept unequal treatment in treaty agreements and implementation (Albin 2006) . If this is true in the NPT, it would help explain the renewed focus at NPT Review Conferences on the issue of whether the NWSs have been meeting their Article VI treaty commitments to work in good faith toward eventual nuclear weapons disarmament (Sagan 2009b) .
As part of this effort to evaluate the NPT and the broader nuclear nonproliferation regime in the future, it will also be necessary to focus beyond the treaty to understand the origins and effectiveness of related nuclear technology export control institutions. We have strong studies of the origins of the NPT itself (Shaker 1980 , Bunn 1992 , Swango 2009 ). But there are no equivalent studies of the origins or effectiveness of the NSG, or UN Security Council Resolution 1540, or the Proliferation Security Initiative. These newer institutions are crucial elements of the nonproliferation regime and should not be ignored.
How Regime Type Influences Nuclear Trajectory
We need more work on how regime type influences decisions about both nuclear power and nuclear proliferation. I have presented the data showing that democracies do not cheat on their NPT commitments, but we do not know why that is the case. Are democracies more constrained than nondemocracies by their treaty commitments, or are they simply more selective in joining only treaties they intend to comply with fully (Simmons & Hopkins 2005 , von Stein 2005 ? If democratic leaders do feel more constrained than nondemocratic leaders, why is this the case? Do they fear "audience costs" (punishment by voters) if they are caught cheating on agreements, or do they believe the likelihood of being caught cheating is higher because of increased transparency and protection of whistleblowers in a democracy (Tomz 2007) ? With respect to the NPT, the simple division between democracies and nondemocracies should be supplemented with studies on the relationship between the political leadership and the scientific community and military. Hymans (2008) , for example, usefully theorizes that PL14CH11-Sagan ARI 18 February 2011 17:14 "neopatrimonial" or "sultanistic" regimesgovernments characterized by extreme personalized rule, use of state resources to buy off clients, and an absence of checks and balanceswill take longer to develop advanced levels of nuclear technology and will fail more often in attempts to move from one technological threshold to the next. Weeks's (2008) work on "autocratic audience costs" in international crises suggests another research question regarding proliferation: Do different types of nondemocratic regimes show different propensities to signal their intent and ability to abide by their NPT commitments? Last, it is possible that democracies may be less likely to move successfully toward nuclear disarmament than nondemocracies because of the increased effect of "nuclear nationalism" among the electorate (Perkovich 1999).
How Nuclear Supply and Nuclear Demand Influence Each Other
We need more interdisciplinary work on the spread of nuclear power and how it influences "nuclear weapons latency" and the "time lines" needed for states to move from different states of civilian power status to nuclear weapons capabilities (Wohlstetter et al. 1977 , Zentner et al. 2005 , Harney et al. 2006 , Sagan 2010 Future efforts to understand nuclear latency and proliferation will be most useful if they study the temporal connection between supply and demand for nuclear weapons instead of treating these two "sides" of nuclear proliferation as separate issues. Three potential connections are obvious. First, how hard a government works on a nuclear weapons program-the resources it commits to the program and whether it is engaged in a "crash" effort or normal construction effort-is likely to be strongly affected by the severity of its demand for a weapon. Second, a high degree of nuclear capability or latency could influence demand by enabling actors who favor a nuclear weapon to argue that acquiring a weapon would be a relatively easy undertaking. Here it is worth differentiating between "latency," a measure of how long it would take for a state to acquire a bomb, and "hedging," which is a deliberate action by a government to make a nuclear weapons program easier in the future. Third, a high degree of latency could make it easier for a pro-nuclear weapons party or individual leaders to implement a decision to acquire nuclear weapons if they are in power for only a brief period of time.
How the Success or Failure of Civilian Nuclear Power Influences Proliferation
Does the civilian nuclear power industry constrain states or does it make nuclear weapons proliferation easier? Do expensive failures to produce efficient nuclear power increase the likelihood of proliferation? An important determinant of the nuclear future will be the degree to which the spread of nuclear power produces new actors in different states that want to maintain peaceful programs and oppose turning civilian energy programs into nuclear weapons programs. Indeed, how best to ensure that civilian nuclear power bureaucracies maintain a strong interest in opposing nuclear weapons proliferation may be the single most critical question to answer for reducing the potentially dangerous effect of the global spread of nuclear power on the likelihood of nuclear weapons proliferation. This is ironic, for although some nonproliferation specialists may not want more countries to start nuclear power programs, once a state starts a nuclear power program its nonproliferation behavior may be strongly influenced by the degree to which its civilian nuclear industry is a successful contributor to national energy production. The leaders and bureaucratic organizations that run successful nuclear power enterprises may have increased incentives to maintain strong ties to the global nuclear power industry, to international capital and technology markets, and to global regulatory agencies-and hence may be more likely to cooperate with the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Leaders of less successful or struggling nuclear power enterprises, in contrast, may be more likely to support clandestine or breakout nuclear weapons development programs to justify their existence, prestige, and high budgets within their state.
CONCLUSIONS
A renaissance in nuclear proliferation studies is under way. Yet, we need more theoretically informed case studies of proliferation and nonproliferation decisions, both to improve our data sets and to test whether the causal mechanisms posited in our theories are actually present. We need better quantitative studies to test the generalizability of our theories. We need more interdisciplinary research on the technical bottlenecks and legal restrictions on the spread of nuclear facilities. These complex research agendas should be linked together to produce more robust findings about the nuclear past and promote better predictions about the global nuclear future.
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